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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GARY M. NAGLE, 
Plaintiff - Appellant, 
vs. 






STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action commenced ~by the Plaintiff 
for the specific performan'Ce of an agreement 1and 
assignment, or in the alternative, for a judgment 
against the Defendant for monies due and owing on 
an agreed account for improvements to real pro-
perty and for monies due on a promissory note and 
also for the foreclosure of the Plaintiff's mechanic's 
lien. 
DISPO'SITION IN LOWER C'OUIR'T 
The Plaintiff was ·awarded ju~dgment against 
the Defen·dant in the amount of $19,738.48 and 
1 
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$S2.'70 costs of court, but the trial court held that 
the Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid and the 
Agreement and Assignment between the parties, 
dated September 1, 19H2, provided for a penalty 
and could not be enforced. 
RE:LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks the reversal of those portions 
of the trial court's judgment which held the Plain-
tiff's mech\anic's lien to be invalid and the Agree-
ment an·d Assignment between 'the parties, da;ted 
September 1, 19'62, to be a penalty and unenforce-
able. 
STA'TEMENT OF FACTS 
T·he Defen·dant is a non-profit corporation 
organized for the recreation of its members. It suc-
ceeded to the Buyer's position under a Uniform 
R1eal Estate ·Contract dated M1ay 23, 1960, to pur-
ch·ase the real 'property commonly known as 1651 
Vin·e Street, ~salt Lake ·City, Utah. The Defendant 
retained for itself 6.315 acres of the land it was 
purchasing ,and sold th·e rem·ainder to th·e Plaintiff 
for residential building lots. !The Plaintiff, a gen-
eral contractor, entered into a written agreement 
with the Defendant dated in April, 19'60, but prob-
ably sign~d in May or June, 1960, whereby the 
Plaintiff agreed to move a cooler hous·e and con-
struct a water line, sewer line, roadway, and bridge 
adjoining and to connect with the real property of 
the Defendant. The Defendant agreed to pay the 
2 
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Plaintiff a proportionate s'hare of the cost of the 
improvements, varying ·between one-third and one-
half of the total, with the Plaintiff to p1ay the oth'er 
share since the Plaintiff would also benefit from 
the planned improvem·ents. T1he Defendant agreed 
to pay the P'laintiff as th·e work progressed iand 
invoi,ces were submitted. Th·e Defendant further 
agreed to deposit in trust $1,000.00 wi'thin forty-
five ( 45) ·days as evidence of its good faith and 
abi1lity to pay. ·such sum was never deposited. 
T·he Plaintiff furnished his first labor and ma-
terials on November 8, 1960. During March or 
April, 1961, the Plaintiff displayed various invoices 
for labor and materiials 'to the Board of Directors 
of Defendant, but Defendant had no funds to make 
payment. In August, 19'61, th'e Plaintiff submitted 
to the Defendant an itemized invoi·ce in the :amount 
of $112,277.26, which was accepted and approved by 
Don E. H1ammill, the President of the Defendant 
Club, but the Defendant was still not able to make 
a paym·ent on account. The Plaintiff completed the 
moving of the cooler house ·and con~s'truction of the 
water line rand sewer line, but did not eomplete 
the roadway and bridge until approximately o~cto­
ber 15, 1962, due to the flailure of the Defendant 
to make payment. 
In January, 1961, the Plaintiff became a mem-
ber of the Defendant, and in January, 196'2, the 
Plaintiff was elected to its Board of Dire·ctors. The 
3 
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Defendant desired to complete the construction of 
its basic improvem·ents so that its members could 
enrjoy the facilities, but did not :have sufficient funds 
on h·and for this purpose. The 'Defendant commenced 
a members:hip drive in March, 196'2, to obtain the 
required funds and entered into a verbal contract 
with the Ptaintiff to construct a club house and deck 
around the swimming pool. The PLa;intiff was to 
receive the funds: made avail'alble by the new mem-
berships as well as labor to be donated by the mem-
bers of the Defendant, so that the facilities would 
be ready by June 1, 196'2. The membership drive 
was unsuccessful, the Plaintiff was not p1aid any 
funds, and the mem·bers did not don~ate the labor as 
promised; however, the Pl'aintiff completed suffi-
ci'etn of the construction work so that the facilities 
could be used during the month of July, 1962. The 
Plaintiff performed his last labor and furnished 
his materials on November 5, 1962, when several 
doors were hung in the club house and it was pre-
pared for winter. 
The Defendant was still not able to pay the 
Plaintiff for the construction of the club house and 
decking around the swimming pool, and on Septem-
ber 1, 196'2, the Defendant executed and delivered 
to the Plaintiff its promissory note of even date 
in the original principal amount of $11,000.00, pay-
able to the order of the Plaintiff one year from its 
date, with interest at 67o per annum, in payment 
of labor and materials for the construction of the 
4 
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club house and ·decking 1around the swimming pool, 
the Defendant h·aving already approved Pl'ainti:ff's 
invoice of $12,277.'26 for the other work performed 
by Plaintiff. T'he promissory note contained an ae-
celleration clause whereby the Plaintiff could ma-
ture the note upon deeming himself insecure. 'This 
promissory note was secured by an Agreement ~a.nd 
Assignment of the same date, wherein the Defendant 
assignmed to Plaintiff all of the Defendant's right, 
title, and interest in and to its Uniform Real Estate 
Contract of May 23, 19'60, under which its real 
property was being purchased. The Agreement :and 
Assignment provided, among other things, that in 
the event of default the Plaintiff could enter upon 
the premises and take possession th·ereof and any 
amounts paid him would be retained as liquidated 
dam!ages and upon demand the Defendant would 
execute an·d deliver a Quit C1aim Deed of its in-
terest in the real property. Paragrap'h 4 of the 
Agreement and Assignment stated that the Plain-
tiff could file and prosecute any mechanic's or ma-
terialmen's liens he might have against the property. 
Since the Plaintiff had received no paym·ent on 
either contract, and for the purpose of further pro-
tecting ·himself, the P1aintiff recorded his Notice 
of Lien in the County Recorder's office of S·alt Lake 
County, U~tah, on December 17, 196'2, as Entry No. 
1888590, in Book 1998, at Page 241, of Official 
Records:. In March, 1963, the Plaintiff desired to 
obtain clear title to the acreage he was purch'asing 
5 
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from the Defendant and paid the Defendant $10,-
771.06 to en~able the Defen·dant to in turn pay said 
sum to the fee title owners so that title could be 
obtained and in addition the Plaintiff received a 
credit of $6,649.78 on the bill of $1'2,'277.26, owing 
to the Plaintiff, which credit was later corrected 
during the trial proceedings to $5,64:9,78. This 
transaction between t~he parties is reflected in a writ-
ten Credit Agreement, dated March 7, 19'6'3, is one 
of the trial ex'hibits, and a part of the record. The 
P'laintiff later deemed himself insecure, acceUer-
a1ted :the maturity date of the note and made written 
demand upon the Defen·dant on April 10, 1963, 
for ·paym'ent in full. Afiter considerable negotiations, 
the Defendant on M·ay 10, 1963, offered to pay the 
note, but m·ade no actual tender of the monies due 
and owing. The Defendant's offer did not include 
reasonable attorney's fees as provided in th'e pro-
missory note and under the Uta:h Statutes on Mech-
anic's Liens, nor the cost of recording his Notice 
of Lien an·d was rejected by the Plaintiff. The Plain-
tiff then filed suit aga~inrS't the D'efendant to en-
foce the terms of the Agreem·en't and Assignment of 
·September 1, 1962; also for the payment of the pro-
missory note and for the foreclosure of his mech-
anic's lien. Plaintiff ·also included in his suit a de-
mand for additional labor performed and personal 
services of the Plaintiff. 
The valu'e of the Defendant's real property 
would not exeeed $8,000.00 per acre. (Page ·21, Line 
6 
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17 of the Excerpts of Transcript of Proceedings) 
T~he Defendant owes a balance un·der its. contract 
of May 23, 1960, to purchase the real property, of 
approximately $·2'"7 ,000.00. 
ARGUMENT 
P10'INT I. 
THAT THE TRI.A!L COURT ERRED IN H·OlJDING 
PLAINTI'FF'S ME1CHANIC'E LIEN INV A:LID. 
The Plaintiff, a general contractor, is one of 
those persons entitled to a mechanic's lien as set 
forth in Title 38-1-3, U.C.A. Also, the Pl~aintiff is 
an original contractor as defined in 38-1-2, U.C.A., 
and recorded his Notice of Lien in sufficient detail 
and within the time required by 38-1-7. 'The Plain-
tiff's action was commenced within one year after 
he furnised his last labor and material and ·his Lis 
Pendens was recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, in the manner 
specified in 38-1-11. Notice to other lien claimants 
of the pending action an·d the tim·e for them to ap-
pear and exhibit their liens was published once per 
week for three successive weeks, pursuant to 38-1-1'2. 
No liens were exhibited nor a·ppearan·ces m·ade by 
other lien elaimants on the day appointed. 
Although the Memo~andum Decision of the 
trial court and the Findings, Con·clusion~s and J udg-
ment do not state the reason for the holding th.at 
the Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid, the re-
marks of the trial judge during the trial proceed-
7 
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ings were to the effect that the Plaintiff's bill for 
labor and m~aterials was paid by the Plaintiff ac-
cepting the $11,000.00 promissory note of Septem-
ber 1, 19'6'2, an·d in so doing the P'laintiff had waived 
hi~s right to a mechanic's lien. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that su·ch is not the law in the State of Utah 
' nor the law of a majority of the 'other jurisdictions 
in this country. In the Uta·h case of L. E. Doame, 
et ~al., Respondents, v. Jeter Clinton Z. Snow, et al, 
Appellants, heard by our Suprem·e Court while Utah 
was still a territory during the term from January, 
1877, to June, 1880, reported in 2 U. 417, th~e Plain-
tiff accepted two prommissory notes from one of 
the Defendants for the amount due for building ma-
terials :an·d three months thereafter recorded his 
Notice of Lien to secure the amount due and owing. 
T'he trial court granted judgnTen:t in favor of the 
Plaintiff and for the foreclosure of his mechanic's 
lien, an·d one of the Defendants appealed. By a un-
animous decision, the ·Chief Justice and both Asso-
ciate Justices affirmed. In quoting from the Court's 
opinion, Justice Boreman stated, "It is claim·ed that 
by ·accepting these notes, the respondents received 
payment of the account. This certainly i>S not the 
law, where no intention to tha;t effect is shown. 
"We presume the appellants meant to say that 
the respondents waived their right to the lien by 
taking the notes. ·Our Statute says that the lien can 
be enforced by suit begun at any time within one 
year after the completion of the building. Both notes 
8 
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fell due within the year, and th·ere does not appear 
to have been any intention to relinquis·h the lien. 
There was, therefore, no waiver of 'the right to file 
the lien or to enforce it. Securities are in their 
nature cumulative, and there is no reason why the 
Court s;hould consider tha:t by taking one a party 
thereby released another, unless there was some 
stipulation or misun·derstanding th·at such should 
be the case. McMurry v. Taylor, 30 Mo. 2'63; Ash-
down v. Woods, 3 Mo. 4·65; Green v. Ely, 2 Greene, 
(Iowa), 508; Mix v. Ely, Ibid. 513; Kinsley v. Buch-
anan, 5 Watts, 118. 
"We do not think that any different view is 
bourne out by the authorities ci'ted by appellants." 
The Uta:h case cited h'as long been and still is 
the law in the State of Utah. 'This case has been 
cited many times by other jurisdictions to the same 
effect. In 65 A.L.R. 283, numrerous cases represen't-
ing the weight of authority are cited with the same 
holding as the Utah ease above mentioned, being 
thirty-nine states in our country ·and also Canada 
and England. This position is further supported by 
57 C.J.S. 798, Sec. 226. 
T'he promissory note executed ·by the Defendant 
and delivered to the Plaintiff matured by its terms 
on September 1, 1963, being a tim~e within the one-
year period allowed by our Sta1tute for the foreclos-
ure of a mechanic's lien. Also, there is nothing in 
the note, nor in the facts and testimony s·howing an 
9 
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intention of the parties that the Plaintiff in acc·ep't-
ing the promissory note relinquished his rights to 
a mechanic's lien, an·d indeed show a contrary intent 
a~s will be mentioned below. 
Nor does the fiact that the Plaintiff accepted 
security for the note, being the Agreement and As-
signment of September 1, 196'2, alter the result. 
Although counsel for the Appellants could find no 
Utah law on this specific point, the genera~ rule is 
that accepting notes secured by a mortgage or deed 
of trust does not amount to a waiver of a mechanic's 
lien unless the parties so intend. Hale v. Burlington, 
C.R. & N.R. Co. ( 1881; C.C.) ·2 McCrary 5'58, 13 
Fed. 203; Gilcrest v. Gottscholk ( 187 4) 39 Iowa 311; 
Gretchell v. Musgrove (1880) ·54 Io~a 744, 7 N.W. 
154; McKeen v. Haseltine (1891) 4·6 Minn. 426,49 
N.W. 195; Hoagland v. Lask (1891) 313 Neb. 376, 
29 Am. St. Rep. 485, 50 N.W. 162; Farmers & M. 
Nat. Bank v. ~aylor ('1897) Tex. 40 S.W. 876. 
6'5 A.L.R. 303. 
Any guessing as to the intention of the parties 
with respect to the Plaintiff's lien rights was re-
moved by Ba:ragraplh 4 of the Agreement an·d Assign-
ment between the p·arties, where it provides, among 
other things, that the Assignee (Plaintiff), at his 
option, could file and prosecute any mechanic's or 
materialmen's lien 'he may nave against said pro-
perty. It would thus app·ear ·that there was no in-
tention to re'linquish or waive the mechanic's lien 
10 
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rights of the Plaintiff and that the Utah case cited 
is controlling and the Plaintiff's m·echanic's: lien 
rights were still in effect and ·his lien was valid. 
POIN'T II. 
'THAT THE TRIA'L C·O'U'RT ERRED IN 1H·OLDI'NG 
THE A·GREE'ME·NT AN'D ASSIGNMENT ·BETIWEEN 
THE PARTIES, DATED SE1P'TEIM·BER 1, 1962, TO BE 
A ·PENA~TY RATHE'R THA:N A FO'RFE'ITURE. 
Whether a sum named in 1a ·contract to be paid 
by a party in default on its breach is to be considered 
liquidated damages or merely a penalty, is one of 
the most difficult and perplexing inquiri'es en·coun-
tered in the constru~tion of written agreements. 
Sun Printing etc., Assoc. v. Moore, 18'3 U.S. 642, 
2'2 S. Ct. 240, 46 L. Ed. 3'6'6. 
It seems to be generally conceded, that each 
case must be permitted to stand pretty much on its 
own peculiarities and particular facts. Keeble v. 
Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 5 S. 149, Grand Union Laundry 
Co. v. Garney, 88 Was'h. 327, 15'3 P. 5. No general 
rules applicable to all contracts are deducible. Dopp 
v. Richards 43 U. 332, 13'5 P. 98. The question is 
one to be determined by the contract fairly con-
strued. Dopp v. Richards, K. P. Min. Co. v. Jacobson, 
30 U. 115, 83 P. 728, 4 L.R.A.N.S. '75·5. 
At the time of the execution ·and delivery of the 
$11,000.00 promissory note and Agreement and As-
signment, ·both dated Septem'ber 1, 19'6'2, the Plain-
tiff had previously moved the cooler h'Ouse, con-
11 
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structed the water and sewer lines, and substan-
tially constructed the roadway and bridge, and the 
Defendant had previously accepted and approved 
the Plaintiff's invoice for said work, in the amount 
of $I2,277.26, but had made no payment on account, 
nor ·had the Plaintiff been paid for the construction 
work performed on the club house and pool deck. 
The Plaintiff was to have been p·aid for his work 
on the club house and pool deck from proceeds of a 
membership drive. Such drive was not successful 
and the Defendant did not obtain funds to pay the 
Plaintiff. At this time, the Defendant Wlas indebted 
to the Palintiff in the amount of $·2'3,217'7.26, and 
p'aym!e:nt was long past due. ~~he Plaintiff could have 
commenced an action against the Defen·dant to col-
lect the monies due him, the effect of which would 
probably h1a1ve been to close down the Defendant 
Club. The Defendant planned on making additional 
improvements and operating the facilities, which 
would probtbly h·ave resulted in incurring new in-
debtedness, making it more difficult for the Plain-
tiff to receive payment. These special facts and cir-
cum,s·ta;nces were in existence and known to the 
parties at the time the promissory note and Agree-
ment an·d Assignment were executed and delivered. 
The reason for the ·provision in the Agreement and 
Assignment that in the event of ·a default in pay-
ment of the note, the Plaintiff could enter upon the 
premises, take possession, together with all im-
provements and any :a:mounts repaid to be retained 
112 
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as liquidated damages, was for the protection and 
security of the Plaintiff for his forbearance. The 
Agreement and Assignment was prepared by Don 
E. Hammill, President of the Defendant and a prac-
ticing attorney, his name /being imprinted in the 
lower left corner of this document. 
In the Utah case of Perkins et .al. v. Spencer, 
a 1952 case, 121 U. 468, 2413 P. 2d 446, the Supreme 
Court of Utah had occasion to consider the matter 
of a penalty in connection with the buyer's default 
under ~a uniform real estate contract. Justice Crock-
ett, who wrote the opinion of th~e Court, stated, 
''This Court is ·committed to the doctrine, th·at where 
the parties to a contract stipulate the amount of 
liquidruted dam·ages that shall be paid in case of a 
breach, such stipulation is, as a gen·eral rule, en-
forceable, if the amount stipulated is not dispro-
portionate to the damages actually sustained." Al8o, 
'~O·n the contrary, wh·ere enforcement of the for-
feiture provision would allow an uncons~cionable and 
exhorb]tant recovery bearing no reasonable relation-
ship to the actual damage suffered, we have uni-
formly iheld it to be unenforceable.'' The Court com-
mented on other Utah cases dealing with the same 
question and ndted they were in accord with Sec. 
339 of the Restatement of Contracts, which provides, 
" ( 1) an agreement made in advance of breach fix-
ing the damages therefor, i~s not enforceable as a 
contract and does not affect the damages recover-
able from the breach, unless (a) ·the amount so fixed 
13 
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is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for 
the harm that is caused by the breach, and (b) the 
harm that is caused by th·e breach is one that i~s 
in·capable or very difficult of accurate estimation." 
At page 21, line 17 of the Excerpts of Trans-
cript of Proceedings, th·e president of the Defendant 
testified ·that some land near the Defendant's real 
property had been sold for $8,000.00 per acre. The 
Defendant ·C'lub was purch·asing 6.315 acres, which 
would. be a value of $50,800.00. The President of 
the Defendant al,go testified th1a1t the balance due and 
owing on the contract was approxim:ately $'2'6,000.00, 
which would give the Defendant a net equity of 
approximately $'24,800.00. 'The Plaintiff's total 
judgement was for $1'9,'7'91.18, which total is not 
disproportionate to the net equity indieruted, the 
amount of said equity being somewh·a:t in question. 
As to the point of whether the Plaintiff's dam-
ages were incapable or very difficult of accurate 
estimation, the record and undisputed facts clearly 
show thJaJt the Defendant was in th·e financial posi-
tion of being in·capable of meeting i'ts bil1s as they 
became due and owing and therefore was technically 
insolvent. Although the 1arnoun't of money owing by 
the Defend·ant to the Plaintiff was known, the fin-
ancial condition of the Defendant m:a:de the damage 
to the Plaintiff through a failure to pay one which 
was incapable or very difficult of accurate estim-
ation. It is respectfully submitted to this Court that 
the question of damage is not just the simple mea-
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surement of an amount due and owing, but in-
cludes as wel'l the prospects of recovery. Tihe ques-
tion as to whether a provision is one for liquidated 
damages or a penalty seems based upon whether 
a party is to be allowed an unconscion·able gain. 
Where no such unconscion:able gain is pres·ent, it 
would be a miscarriage of justice to define damage 
in the n1arrow sense of just the ·amount due and 
owing, wi'thout including as is presented ~by this 
case, the chances of an ultimate recovery. Such a 
holding by this ·Court would be consistent with the 
prior Utah cases and would ·prevent a miscarriage 
of justice. 
p·o(INT I'll. 
·THAT THE DEFENDANT, THROUGH ITS c·oN-
D'U'GT, H.NS WAIVED THE RIG'HT TO Q'UESTI'ON 
THE VAIJIDITY OF THE AGREEMEN'T AIN·D ASSIG·N-
MENT OF SEPTE1MBER 1, 196·2, AND IS ES'TOPPE1D 
F1ROM CLAIMING THAT TT EXA:C·TS PENALTY. 
The promissory note and Agreement and As~ 
signment of September 1, 19'62, were both ·prepared 
by the President of the Defendant, Don E. H·ammill, 
1a; practicing attorney. 'Mr. Hammill was a person 
trained in the law and h·ad a superior knowledge of 
legal matters as compared with 'the Plaintiff, who 
was a layman. It could be safely stated that in reald-
ing these documents, the Plaintiff concluded that 
the wording meant exactly wha;t it said and in ac-
cepting said document for further forbearta;n·ce, the 
Plainftiff relied upon the remedies given to him in 
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the Agreement and Assignment. Upon the execu-
tion of these documents, 'the Defendant received a 
valuable benefit, i.e., time within which to further 
develop the Defendant C'lub and raise new capital. 
Where on·e receives the benefit from a contract, he 
is ~estopped from questioning the existence, validity 
an~d effect of the contract. 21 C.J. t209, Sec. 211 
(C). 
In the U'tah case of Ravarino v. Price, et al., 
195'3, 123 U. 559, 260 P. 2d. '570, the Utah Supreme 
Court had occasion 'to consider the matter of an 
estoppe1l against the Defense of tile Statute of 
Frauds. In considering this quest!on, the Court held 
that ·a promise which the promisor sh'Ould reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance of a 
·definite 1a:nd substantial character on th'e part of 
the promisee, an·d which does induce su·ch action or 
fo~bearance, is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of 'the promise. Further, that 
a promissory estoppel is applied where the promise 
of the promisor as to his future conduct constitutes 
an intended abandonment of an existing right on his 
part. Should this Court consider the agreement in 
question to have provided for ~a penalty, it would 
ap~pear that the docum~ent h'aving been prepared by 
the . Defen·dant's President, a legally trained indi-
vidual of superior kn,owledge to the Plaintiff, the 
Defendant has waived and is estopp,ed to claim thJat 
such documenit provides for a penalty where the 
Plaintiff relied upon the same in forbearance of 
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the monies due and owing to 'him, all to his d'etriment 
and loss. 
CON'CL USION 
It is earnestly contended by the Plaintiff th1at 
the provision in question in the Agreement and As-
signmen of September 1, 196'2, is not a penalty f.or 
the reason~s mentioned in the argument on Point I, 
and that this Court should so :hold in its opinion 
and remand ·this cause to th·e trial court with in-
structions that the Defendant be ord'ered to Quit 
Claim its interest in the real property to the P1ain-
tiff in accordance wi'th the terms of said Agreement 
and Assignment. 
'Should this ·Court determine however, th·at such 
provision in the Agreement and Assignment is a 
penalty, that the Defendant has waived the right 
to claim the same and due to the speci1a1 facts and 
circums~ances present and the superior legal knowl-
edge of the President of the Defendant and the 
benefits received of forbearance through the Plain-
tiff agreeing to accept the promissory and Agree-
ment and Assignment, the Defendant is and hlas 
been estopped to assert the matter of ·a penalty as 
a defense. 
Irrespective of the above, it is the Plaintiff's 
considered conclusion th~at he ·has a valid mechanic's 
lien which was not w.aived 'through his acceptance 
of the promissory note and Agreement and Assign-
m·ent and all of the requisite, statutory and proce-
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dural steps. for its foreclosure were met. This con-
clusion is fully supported by the facts of this case, 
which can he interpreted in ·no other way, and es-
pecially is it _supported by the case law of 'this State. 
(L.- E~ Doane, et ~al., Respondents, v. Jeter Clinton 
Z._Sr~ow, et~al., Appellants) . 
From·tne standpoint of the prompt administra-
tion ·of- justice, the Appellant -prefers the relief pro-
v~ded .~n- the Agreement ~and Assignment, ·i.e., the 
right to take possession of ·the real property in ques-
tion . an·d receive a Quit Claim Deed of all of the 
r·}ght, title, interest and equity of tfue Respondent. 
However, if for some rea'Son ·this Honora:ble Court 
does not agree wilth the contention th1at the provision 
in.the Agreement an·d Assignm·ent is not a penalty, 
or· if it is that the Respon·dent ·has waived the right 
fo- assert the same and is estopped therefrom, then 
this matter S1hould be rem·anded to the trial court 
with instructions .·fuat Appellant's mechanic's lien 
is valid !and. an Order to be entered by 1Jhe trtal court 
permitting i1ts foreclosure an·d a Sheriff's ·sale in 
the manner ·provided by 'law. 
R·espeetfully submitted, 
HALLIDAY & HALLIDAY 
400 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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